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There is a peculiar inconsistency within current legal scholarship 
concerning the role of the courts in commercial relationships during the 
colonial period. Colonial legal scholars universally recognize that debt 
litigation ending in default judgments overwhelmed the caseload of colonial 
courts. At issue, however, is whether this high level of uncontested cases 
reflects a rationally organized effort of creditors and debtors to endow 
credit agreements with greater security, or whether these uncontested cases 
represent efforts to collect after real defaults and, thus, are evidence of 
widespread colonial insolvency. 
Recent colonial law scholarship asserts that creditors and debtors used 
litigation as a means of endowing credit agreements with greater security.1 
Colonial legal scholars found that the percentage of cases ending in default 
judgments increased dramatically in the 1720s and 1730s and remained at 
very high levels throughout the eighteenth century.2 When debtors did not 
default, they often confessed judgment against themselves, conceding 
responsibility for their debt.3 The prevailing interpretation today among 
colonial scholars is that the rise in uncontested debt cases and confessions 
of judgment by debtors is evidence of creditors and debtors using the court 
system as a rational mechanism to record debts. Creditors brought suit 
against debtors because becoming judgment creditors secured their interest 
in debtors' property by allowing quick execution at their discretion. The 
high level of uncontested cases and confessions of judgment represent 
voluntary debtor participation in the system: Debtors acquiesced to the 
entry of judgments against them (by default) because they too benefited 
from the bureaucratization of credit. Thus, according to the current 
1. For a more detailed explanation of the current scholarship, see infra notes 19-35 and 
accompanying text. 
2. See infra note 22. 
3. See infra note 23 and accompanying text. 
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interpretation, the increase in uncontested debt litigation indicates not an 
increase in underlying disputes or in economic distress, but rather the 
creation of a modernized mechanism for debt recording, similar in kind to 
today's perfection of security interests through Article 9 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code. This view will be termed here the "debt-recording 
interpretation" of colonial litigation. 
Yet, while the debt-recording interpretation of colonial courts is the 
dominant explanation of default judgments in current colonial law 
scholarship, other evidence characterizes the operations of the colonial 
court system in a dramatically different way. In 1786 and 1787, shortly 
after the Revolution, Shays' Rebellion constituted a widespread attack on 
the structure of the colonial court system, culminating in the violent 
takeover and closing of many county courts in western Massachusetts and 
throughout New England. The Shaysites (who referred to themselves as 
"Regulators") raised an armed revolt against the colonial court system. 
They condemned its injurious costliness, its fee structure which, they 
claimed, enabled judges, witnesses, and sheriffs to profit at the expense of 
litigants, and its cooptation by lawyers.4 
Defenders of the regime dismissed the Regulators as "men in distress 
involved in debt and discontented"5 and desiring "equal distribution of 
property," and "the annihilation of debts."6 Several of the Regulators' 
principal court reform proposals, however, were designed chiefly to reduce 
costs and administer justice more effectively. Indeed, although some 
Regulator proposals were clearly radical-such as to entirely abolish the 
courts of common pleas7-others were more moderate. One Regulator 
proposed adopting a system according to which creditors and debtors could 
inexpensively record and secure debts, for example, by substituting the 
common pleas courts with "courts of record" that would specifically 
provide a debt-securing and recording service. Others proposed that the 
Massachusetts General Court enact legislation to provide for an inexpensive 
process to record debts within the common pleas system. The General 
Court responded by enacting the Confession Act of 1786,9 which allowed 
4. For histories of the Rebellion, see DAVID P. SZATMARY, SHAYS' REBELLION: THE 
MAKING OF AN AGRARIAN INSURRECTION (1980); and ROBERT J. TAYLOR, WESTERN 
MASSACHUSETTS IN THE REVOLUTION (1954). Shays' Rebellion is discussed in greater detail 
infra Part IV. 
5. Letter from William Plumer to John Hale (Aug. 13, 1786), in 11 PUBLICATIONS COLONIAL 
SOC'Y MASS. 386, 386 (1910). 
6. Letter from William Plumer to John Hale (Sept. 20, 1786), in 11 PUBLICATIONS COLONIAL 
SOC'Y MASS. 390, 392 (1910). 
7. See, e.g., TAYLOR, supra note 4, at 135 (citing Honestus, INDEP. CHRON. (Boston), June 
15,1786). 
8. See id. at 198 n.21 (citing Newton, INDEP. CHRON. (Boston), June 8, 1786). 
9. 1786-1787 Mass. Acts 105-11, ch. 43. For a more detailed discussion of the Act, see infra 
notes 137-141 and accompanying text. 
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debtors to avoid costly litigation in any debt case by " confessing" 
judgments against themselves to a justice of the peace for a small fee. 
There is therefore a deep incompatibility between the debt-recording 
interpretation of colonial courts and the apparent motivations for Shays' 
Rebellion. The incompatibility is reflected not only in the Regulators' 
revolt against what they claimed to be a destructively inefficient court 
system, but also in the nature of the reforms enacted to quell the 
Regulators' demands. If colonial courts functioned in the eighteenth century 
as efficient modem-like debt-recording institutions, what motivated the 
Regulators to armed rebellion against their operation? Similarly, the 
General Court enacted the Confession Act to increase the efficiency of debt 
collection by permitting creditors to record debts cheaply in advance of 
execution.10 Why would a principal reform of the 1780s advance the 
judicial system in the direction of a recording institution if, as colonial 
scholars suggest, that system had been made operational over fifty years 
before? Accounts of Shays' Rebellion cast doubt on the existence of an 
institutionalized recording system in Massachusetts during the colonial 
period and suggest, as a general matter, that colonial courts were far more 
costly and inefficient than colonial legal scholars have described. 
These questions are central to understanding how the administration of 
colonial courts could provoke armed rebellion against the government as 
well as the role of colonial courts in enforcing commercial transactions. The 
principal ambition of institutions providing for debt securing and recording 
is to reduce the cost of credit: first, by generating information that will 
increase creditors' certainty about their chances of repayment and, second, 
by reducing the costs of executing on debtors' possessions upon default. 
Toward this end, a well-functioning debt-recording system should make 
available information about existing claims on debtors' property, enforce a 
priority-collection system-assuring creditors of their position in obtaining 
debtors' assets-and, by recording debts, generate evidence to substantiate 
claims of default to lower collection costs.11 Greater security leads to credit 
at lower prices.12 
10. The General Court's intent is clear from the Act's title, "An Act for Rendering Process in 
Law Less Expensive." See 1786-1787 Mass. Acts 105, ch. 43. 
11. See ALAN SCHWARTZ & ROBERT E. SCOTT, COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS 546-48, 565 
(2d ed. 1991) (discussing the general ambitions of the Uniform Commercial Code's system of 
recording and securing credit). Legal scholars have questioned the extent to which the UCC's 
secured credit regime increases economic welfare principally because secured credit may simply 
benefit secured creditors at the expense of unsecured creditors. For a general review of both 
theories and criticisms of secured credit, see DOUGLAS G. BAIRD & THOMAS H. JACKSON, 
SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY: CASES, PROBLEMS, AND MATERIALS 316-42 (2d 
ed. 1987); and Alan Schwartz, Security Interests and Bankruptcy Priorities: A Review of Current 
Theories, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1981). 
12. See SCHWARTZ & SCOTT, supra note 11, at 546; Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. 
Jackson, Possession and Ownership: An Examination of the Scope of Article 9, 35 STAN. L. REV. 
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Thus, it is central to our understanding of colonial law to determine 
whether, as a debt-collecting institution, colonial courts were well- 
functioning and modernized or inefficiently costly and operating to the 
benefit of judges, sheriffs, and lawyers at the expense of the citizenry. 
Moreover, debt cases dominated civil court dockets throughout the colonial 
period.13 While it is accepted that, during the nineteenth century, courts 
affected the American economy through their articulation of the law of 
torts, contracts, and statute-based legal fields such as corporations, during 
the colonial period, in contrast, the judiciary affected economic 
development principally through its enforcement of credit relationships.14 
It is not useful to evaluate judicial "efficiency" in the abstract. This 
Note presents an empirical examination of the nature of default judgments 
and confession of judgment cases in the colonial courts. It attempts to 
determine whether these cases represented creditors and debtors using 
litigation to record debts or, instead, actual defaults by debtors. Toward that 
end, it analyzes two empirical and legal dimensions of judicial operations 
that have not been adequately explored. First, there is a sharp difference 
between the characterization by colonial scholars of the courts as a 
modernized bureaucracy and by the Regulators as a costly and burdensome 
institution chiefly benefiting the legal officers who managed it. Neither 
account to date has carefully examined the fee structure of colonial courts 
and measured the magnitude of court fees imposed in each case against the 
magnitude of debt to be collected. 
Second, according to the debt-recording interpretation, litigation 
occurred not when a debt was due, nor when a creditor wanted to execute 
on a debtor's possessions, but immediately after the creditor extended 
credit, in order to record the debt.15 In contrast, the Regulators' complaints 
175, 175 (1983) ("To the extent that the creditor is uncertain about the priority of his security 
interest, and thus about whether he will recover his loan in full if the debtor defaults, he will 
require a higher interest rate from the debtor."). 
13. William E. Nelson found that debt cases constituted 74% of all cases heard during the 
period 1725 to 1774 in the Plymouth, Massachusetts County Court of Common Pleas, the court of 
original jurisdiction for civil lawsuits. See WILLIAM E. NELSON, DISPUTE AND CONFLICT 
RESOLUTION IN PLYMOUTH COUNTY, MASSACHUSETTS, 1725-1825, at 23-24 (1981). 
14. Colonial legal historians of the last generation have universally agreed on the importance 
of debt to an understanding of colonial law and its impact on the colonial economy. See, e.g., 
CORNELIA HUGHES DAYTON, WOMEN BEFORE THE BAR: GENDER, LAW, AND SOCIETY IN 
CONNECTICUT, 1639-1789, at 70 (1995) ("The area of law that touched the most people in early 
New England was, not crime, but civil litigation, especially suits for debt."); BRUCE H. MANN, 
NEIGHBORS AND STRANGERS: LAW AND COMMUNITY IN EARLY CONNECTICUT 8 (1987) 
(discussing the "overwhelming predominance of debt cases in civil litigation" in the colonial 
period); A.G. ROEBER, FAITHFUL MAGISTRATES AND REPUBLICAN LAWYERS: CREATORS OF 
VIRGINIA LEGAL CULTURE, 1680-1810, at 39-41 (1981) (focusing on the "'tissue of debt' that 
enmeshed all of Virginia's planters"); Deborah A. Rosen, Courts and Commerce in Colonial New 
York, 36 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 139, 140 (1992) (characterizing the nonpayment of debts as the 
"quintessential legal injury" of the 18th century). 
15. See infra notes 29-32. 
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imply that debt litigation was real, not nominal, and represented the 
palpable prospect of paying high costs and losing property, suggesting that 
creditors litigated after other attempts to collect against debtors had failed. 
These contrasting characterizations suggest a substantial difference in 
timing from the date that credit was extended until the date of litigation. 
Again, neither account to date has carefully examined the timing of debt 
litigation. 
This Note evaluates these different interpretations of the operation of 
the colonial courts, relying on an empirical study of over 5000 cases in the 
Plymouth, Massachusetts County Court of Common Pleas,'6 during the 
years 1724 to 1750 and 1781 to 1795.'7 It examines for sample years the 
relationship between judicial fees and the level of underlying debt. Second, 
the Note measures the time between the extension of credit and debt 
litigation for all 5048 cases. The data suggest the need to reassess colonial 
courts' role in debt collection. 
First, the data show that Massachusetts's court fees were extremely 
high, comprising a substantial portion of the median debt even when a 
creditor simply obtained a default judgment. This finding alone casts doubt 
on the characterization of colonial courts as efficient and well-functioning. 
Moreover, following the English rule, civil litigation in the colonies 
operated on a strict loser-pays fee system. Thus, in default and confession 
of judgment cases, the entirety of the large fees associated with debt 
collection through the courts was paid by debtors. The English-rule fee 
system has been neglected in colonial historians' interpretations of debt 
litigation. It suggests skepticism, however, about the claim that debtors 
voluntarily confessed debt to facilitate efficient debt administration. 
The Plymouth County data also show that the period of time between 
execution of a loan and litigation to collect the debt was characterized by 
wide variance, rather than by the uniformity suggested by the debt- 
recording interpretation of colonial litigation. Indeed, the number of 
instances in which litigation was filed at or shortly after loan execution was 
very small, exactly in contrast to the current interpretation. 
As I shall show, the high cost of litigating in colonial Massachusetts 
suggests an explanation for the wide variance in the timing of litigation: 
High court fees created a disincentive to sue until creditors learned that 
their debtors might default. Thus, the imposition of high fees in colonial 
courts prevented the use of litigation as a modem recording device. This 
16. See 1-10 PLYMOUTH COURT RECORDS, 1686-1859 (David Thomas Konig ed., 1978- 
1980) [hereinafter PLYMOUTH COURT RECORDS]. For a discussion of the publication of the court 
records and the representativeness of Plymouth County within New England, see William E. 
Nelson, Introduction to 1 PLYMOUTH COURT RECORDS, supra. 
17. For an explanation of why these periods were chosen and a more detailed description of 
the empirical study, see infra notes 82-85 and accompanying text. 
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Note presents evidence on actual litigation timing that suggests, instead, 
that creditors typically sued six to nine months after default, evidence of 
real economic distress. 
The high costs of colonial debt-administration and the forces 
influencing the timing of debt litigation imply a deeper understanding of the 
background and motivation for Shays' Rebellion. Although creditors had an 
incentive to postpone litigation under stable economic conditions, 
widespread insolvency and uncertainty during the postwar recession of 
1783 to 1785, which may have rivaled the Great Depression in severity,18 
propelled creditors to the courts in droves. High court fees meant that 
litigation to collect subjected debtors to obligations vastly increased over 
their original debts. Shays' Rebellion, thus, was triggered by the recession 
and an inefficient and expensive court process. The Massachusetts General 
Court enacted reforms in response to Shays' Rebellion that were 
specifically designed to encourage creditors to record debts. The 
introduction of these procedural reforms in the 1780s suggests their absence 
in the earlier colonial period. 
The empirical and legal findings of this Note suggest a new 
interpretation of colonial courts' role in commercial transactions. Colonial 
legal scholars have correctly described litigation as a means of endowing 
credit agreements with greater security, but they have neglected a crucial 
empirical point. In Massachusetts, the high fees of colonial courts deterred 
creditors from litigating until they believed that their debtors would actually 
default. As a result, colonial creditors and debtors, as a general matter, 
incurred the costs that debt-recording systems such as the modern UCC 
reduce and eliminate: the costs of gathering information about debtors' 
other debts, a reduction in the supply of credit because of creditors' 
uncertainty about their priority with respect to other creditors, and the 
expenses of litigating when creditors feared that they would not otherwise 
be repaid. Moreover, the inefficiencies of the colonial courts suggest that 
the Shaysites' concerns with the court system were entirely legitimate. 
Part I describes in more detail the current scholarship on the colonial 
court system and the debt-recording interpretation of the rise in uncontested 
debt litigation. Part II assesses the impact of litigation costs on colonial 
debtors. Part III analyzes economic considerations influencing a creditor's 
decision to litigate. Part III also presents the Plymouth County empirical 
data showing the actual timing of debt litigation. On the basis of this 
understanding of the colonial courts, Part IV, then, turns to Shays' 
Rebellion. Sections A and B describe economic conditions and remedial 
legislation preceding Shays' Rebellion. Section C analyzes the impact of 
recession conditions on litigation. Section D describes the legislative 
18. See infra note 115 and accompanying text. 
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attempts to institute a debt-recording system in response to Shays' 
Rebellion. Finally, Part V discusses the implications of the lack of a debt- 
recording system to an understanding of colonial courts' role in commercial 
relationships. 
I. DEBT LITIGATION IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY: 
MODERNIZATION AND THE DEBT-REcORDING INTERPRETATION 
Recent colonial law scholarship, most prominently Bruce Mann's 
Neighbors and Strangers, emphasizes that the legal system transformed in 
the first half of the eighteenth century to provide conditions for greater 
commercialization and economic development. The law transformed, 
according to Mann, in response to an expansion of trade relations 
accompanying population growth, military expeditions, agricultural 
specialization, and greater monetization of the economy through 
government paper-money issues.19 In the first decades of the eighteenth 
century, colonists, when extending credit, increasingly relied on signed and 
sealed credit instruments, particularly conditional bonds and promissory 
notes. Mann found that greater reliance on notes and bonds coincided with 
an exponential increase in debt litigation volume, above increases in 
population, and that most of the cases contributing to the litigation increase 
were cases ending in default judgments.20 By 1730, the Hartford Inferior 
Courts of Common Pleas21 entered judgments in favor of creditors in over 
90% of debt cases by default-with no appearance by the debtor.22 When 
defendant debtors did appear, they often confessed judgment against 
themselves.23 
The prevailing explanation of the increase in litigation generally and of 
the specific increase in uncontested debt cases derives from the hypothesis 
that the courts were transforming to promote commercialization. Legal 
historians interpret the rise in cases where debtors defaulted or confessed 
judgment as evidence of increased credit opportunities and economic 
advance. According to Mann: 
19. See MANN, supra note 14, at 31. 
20. See id. at 27-41. 
21. The Inferior Courts of Common Pleas had original jurisdiction over all civil matters 
concerning amounts greater than 40 shillings in which the Crown was not a plaintiff and, thus, 
were the principal fora for initiating private debt actions. See WILLIAM E. NELSON, 
AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW: THE IMPACT OF LEGAL CHANGE ON 
MASSACHUSETTS SOCIETY, 1760-1830, at 15-16 (1975). 
22. Mann found that the percentage of uncontested cases on written instruments in the 
Hartford County Court rose from 60% in 1700 and 1710, to 70.8% in 1720, and to 95.6% in 1730, 
remaining in the 90% range thereafter. See MANN, supra note 14, at 172 tbl.2. Dayton's study of 
the New Haven County Court revealed that, during the period 1770 to 1773, 342 of 385 (89%) of 
all debt cases were uncontested. See DAYTON, supra note 14, at 100 tbl.3. 
23. See MANN, supra note 14, at 39-40. 
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Commercial expansion brought with it-indeed, rode the crest of- 
a rising tide of indebtedness.... The sharp increase in uncontested 
debt actions in the 1730s, in particular the sudden tendency of 
debtors to confess judgment against themselves to facilitate 
collection by their creditors should they fail to repay, underscored 
not only the massive increase in indebtedness but also the 
acceptance of indebtedness as a necessary cost of doing business.24 
Cases ending in default judgments and confessions of judgment signal 
commercialization because this litigation was intended to generate more 
secure credit agreements, not to resolve disputes. A "judgment creditor" 
could more easily execute on a debtors' possessions and, thus, had greater 
security of repayment. Widespread use of litigation in this way turned the 
courts into a recording system and represented "the emergence of a 
culturally powerful, formalistic, rationalized legal system." 25 
The debt-recording interpretation has two implications. First, historians 
assert that the entry of default judgments represents an agreement by 
debtors to be sued as an element of the bargain to receive credit. Debtors 
conceded liability because creditors with greater security would extend 
credit at lower interest rates.26 According to Mann, "credit had become 
something extended in single transactions in return for formal admissions of 
liability." 27 Although Deborah Rosen views the nature of default judgments 
as a perplexing historical problem, she suggests that debt lawsuits may have 
been brought " collusively, that is, with the consent of the defendant-debtor, 
as a way of securing the debt." 28 
Second, creditors brought suit on debt instruments before they intended 
to collect the debt, which is to say that they sued in order to secure the debt 
against other creditors, not to demand payment. According to Mann, " [a]ll 
of the confessions of judgment and an indeterminate number of the defaults 
represent creditors reducing the debts to judgments before they had any 
intention of trying to collect from the debtor." 29 Cornelia Dayton concurs, 
noting that " [t]he predictability of getting a judgment [on signed credit 
instruments] .... turned eighteenth-century debt litigation into a recording 
24. Id. at 62; see also DAYTON, supra note 14, at 90, 102 (interpreting increased debt 
litigation as evidence of an expansion of credit and commercialization); Rosen, supra note 14, at 
142 (same). 
25. Cornelia Dayton, Law and Disputing in Commercializing Early America, 87 MICH. L. 
REv. 1538, 1543 (1989) (reviewing MANN, supra note 14). 
26. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
27. MANN, supra note 14, at 40. 
28. Deborah A. Rosen, The Supreme Court of Judicature of Colonial New York: Civil 
Practice in Transition, 1691-1760, 5 LAW & HIST. REv. 213, 233 (1987). Rosen suggests that the 
high rate of uncontested cases may also either represent real defaults, as is examined here, or 
creditors uing to avoid a six-year statute of limitations. See id. 
29. MANN, supra note 14, at 40. 
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device: ... creditors waited to execute those easily won judgments until 
they wished to call in the debt." 30 
Although the scholars advancing the debt-recording interpretation of 
colonial litigation have not addressed these questions directly, there are 
three clear empirical implications of the theory. First, the historians imply 
that the court fees associated with debt litigation were modest in 
comparison to the debt; otherwise, creditors and debtors would not agree to 
the process. It would be inconsistent with the interpretation to find that 
court fees constituted an abnormally large percentage of debt, inflicted on 
one transacting party to his or her detriment. 
In addition, the debt-recording interpretation implies that litigation to 
enforce the debt was brought at the time that the debt was executed or 
shortly thereafter. The essential ambition of debt recordation, obviously, is 
to establish a legal priority to the debtor's assets. As a consequence, there is 
no purpose in delay; indeed, delay of any period reduces the value of the 
debt by affording an opportunity for other creditors to establish claims prior 
or equivalent to the previously extended debt. Thomas Russell's recent 
study of nineteenth-century debt litigation in South Carolina extends the 
influence of the debt-recording interpretation in this respect. Russell reveals 
that, by the mid-nineteenth century, creditors filed suit, obtained judgments 
against debtors, and executed on debtors' possessions on the same day that 
they entered debt agreements.3' In Russell's account, creditors used 
litigation to establish priority over other creditors, rather than to collect 
against the debtor. Russell relies on Mann's " recording mechanism" 
interpretation to conclude that concomitance of litigation and lending 
originated in the middle of the eighteenth century.32 Thus, it would be 
inconsistent with the debt-recording interpretation to find substantial 
periods of time between execution of the debt and litigation to collect it. 
Third, there is a fundamental incompatibility between the debt- 
recording interpretation of litigation and the Regulators' attack of the court 
system as costly, inefficient, and lacking a mechanism by which creditors 
and debtors could inexpensively secure debts. If court fees imposed huge 
burdens on debtors, then the courts were less efficient than recent 
30. DAYTON, supra note 14, at 91; see also id. at 102 ("Debt litigation had become a 
recording device for the easy credit available to propertied and professional men, craftsmen, and 
entrepreneurs eager to expand their landholdings and businesses."); Rosen, supra note 28, at 234 
(referring to colonial debt litigation as a "recording device"). 
31. See Thomas D. Russell, The Antebellum Courthouse as Creditors' Domain: Trial-Court 
Activity in South Carolina and the Concomitance of Lending and Litigation, 40 AM. J. LEGAL 
HIST. 331 (1996). 
32. See id. at 362-63 ("By the middle of the eighteenth century in Connecticut, patterns of 
litigation resembled, in broad outline, those of antebellum South Carolina.... Mann's creditors of 
the mid-eighteenth century did routinely secure judgments through either confessions or default 
judgments in order to expedite their access to debtors' property in the event of default."). 
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scholarship suggests. Moreover, these fees would lead to even greater 
burdens on debtors during periods of recession, when insolvency and 
uncertainty drove creditors to litigate despite the tremendous cost imposed 
on debtors further imperiling collection of the debt. The incompatibility 
between the account of colonial courts in legal scholarship and the 
Regulators' protests raises questions about the applicability of the debt- 
recording interpretation, at least to Massachusetts,33 and, indeed, about the 
broader role of the court system in commercial relationships. 
Aside from Russell, these empirical implications of the debt-recording 
interpretation of colonial litigation have not been studied and, including 
Russell, never from eighteenth-century data. Nor have legal historians 
systematically examined the broader question of what determines a 
creditor's choice to sue given the characteristics of the colonial legal 
system.35 The following Parts of this Note empirically examine the 
implications of the debt-recording interpretation and litigation trends 
preceding Shays' Rebellion as a means of analyzing the nature of the 
colonial courts and litigation. 
II. THE COSTLINESS OF COLONIAL DEBT LITIGATION 
A central element of the interpretation of colonial debt litigation as 
serving a modem recording function is the assumption that debtors 
acquiesced to default judgments against themselves because they benefited, 
perhaps through lower interest rates, from a more rational administration of 
credit. No legal historian thus far has analyzed the costliness of colonial 
debt litigation empirically. This Part describes the structure of the colonial 
fee system and uses court records and wage data to assess the impact of 
court fees on debtors facing litigation. Section A describes the structure of 
colonial court fees. Section B presents the empirical data relating court fees 
to the magnitude of underlying debt and to colonial wage levels. 
33. Each colony had an independent legal system. This study focuses on Massachusetts. 
Mann's, Dayton's, and Rosen's studies focus on Connecticut and New York. Precise comparisons 
between colonies have yet to be made. 
34. In addition, closer attention to economic scholarship raises doubt about the conception 
that legal developments propelled economic growth during the colonial period. See, e.g., JAMES 
A. HENRETTA, Wealth and Social Structure, in THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM: 
COLLECTED ESSAYS 148, 166-67 (1991) (finding that, although there is variation between 
economists' studies, all current scholarship places annual per capita growth rates in the New 
England colonies within the range of 0.2%-0.5%); JOHN J. MCCUSKER & RUSSELL R. MENARD, 
THE ECONOMY OF BRITISH AMERICA, 1607-1789, at 280 tbl.13.1 (1991) (finding no substantial 
change in per capita exports from Great Britain to the New England colonies during the period 
1767 to 1774). These studies have largely been neglected by colonial legal scholars. 
35. But see Robert A. Kagan, The Routinization of Debt Collection: An Essay on Social 
Change and Conflict in the Courts, 18 LAW & Soc'y REv. 323 (1984) (including cost as a factor 
leading to changes in litigation rates in the 20th century). 
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A. The Fee Structure of Colonial Courts 
Colonial courts had a fee structure entirely different from ours today. 
First, litigants compensated the various actors in the judicial system- 
sheriffs, judges, clerks, and witnesses-for each service they performed.36 
According to the 1742 Massachusetts fee schedule, for example, when 
initiating a suit in one of the inferior courts, plaintiffs paid the judge five 
shillings for entering the action and the constable six pence for serving the 
summons (and double all fees if the plaintiff was not a freeholder).37 Fee 
schedules required reimbursement for travel and a per-day attendance fee to 
all clerks, judges, constables, and witnesses. Litigants paid clerks for each 
page written, constables for each witness sworn, and the cryer for each jury 
called.38 Conclusion of the case led to additional charges, whether for the 
trial, for default or confession of judgment (six pence to the judges, six 
pence to the clerk for recording the outcome), or for imprisonment of the 
debtor (two shillings and six pence for "turning the key on each prisoner 
committed" ).39 The colonial fee structure was regressive; costs were the 
same, no matter how large the amount in question. Moreover, colonial law 
36. The court fee structure represented a standard means of payment for government services 
at the time. As described by Bernard Bailyn, government officials typically received 
compensation from "fees, bribes, and gifts," rather than salaries during the colonial period. 
BERNARD BAILYN, THE NEW ENGLAND MERCHANTS IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 164 
(1979). On colonial fee structure generally, see DAYTON, supra note 14, at 49; and Joseph H. 
Smith, Introduction to COLONIAL JUSTICE IN WESTERN MASSACHUSETTS (1639-1702): THE 
PYNCHON COURT RECORD 189-90 (Joseph H. Smith ed., 1961). 
37. See 3 ACTS AND RESOLVES, PUBLIC AND PRIVATE, OF THE PROVINCE OF 
MASSACHUSETTS BAY 13-18, ch. 5 (Boston, Wright 1878) [hereinafter 3 ACTS AND RESOLVES OF 
MASSACHUSETTS]. The Massachusetts courts' fee structure was revised repeatedly throughout the 
17th and 18th centuries. See, e.g., 1 ACTS AND RESOLVES, PUBLIC AND PRIVATE, OF THE 
PROVINCE OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY 84-88, ch. 37 (Boston, Wright & Potter 1869) (1692 fee 
schedule) [hereinafter 1 ACTS AND RESOLVES OF MASSACHUSETTS]; 3 ACTS AND RESOLVES OF 
MASSACHUSETTS, supra, at 101-07, ch. 10 (1743 fee schedule); id. at 176-81, ch. 13 (1744 fee 
schedule); id. at 328-33, ch. 24 (1747 fee schedule); id. at 525-31, ch. 8 (1751 fee schedule); id. at 
656-66, ch. 28 (1753 fee schedule); id. at 1032-38, ch. 30 (1757 fee schedule); 5 ACTS AND 
RESOLVES, PUBLIC AND PRIVATE, OF THE PROVINCE OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY 486-95, ch. 23 
(Boston, Wright & Potter 1886) (1776 fee schedule) [hereinafter 5 ACTS AND RESOLVES OF 
MASSACHUSETTS]; id. at 761-70, ch. 17 (1778 fee schedule); 1782-1783 Mass. Acts 10-24, ch. 5 
(1782 fee schedule); 1784-1785 Mass. Acts 458-62, ch. 18 (1785 fee schedule); 1786-1787 Mass. 
Acts 226-38, ch. 73 (1786 fee schedule). See generally TAYLOR, supra note 4, at 31 (describing 
fee schedule revisions). In 1728, and again in 1739, the General Court responded to the increase in 
the percentage of default judgments by granting more money per jury trial to jurors and witnesses. 
See 2 ACTS AND RESOLVES, PUBLIC AND PRIVATE, OF THE PROVINCE OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY 
at 463-64, ch. 10 (Boston, Wright & Potter 1874) [hereinafter 2 ACTS AND RESOLVES OF 
MASSACHUSETTS]; id. at 938-39, ch. 4. 
38. See 3 ACTS AND RESOLVES OF MASSACHUSETTS, supra note 37, at 16-17, ch. 5. 
39. See id.at 17. 
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defined court costs as well as attorneys' fees as an element of damages. As 
a consequence, the losing party bore the burden of paying all fees.40 
Corrupt government officials, witnesses and jurors also may have 
increased fees from time to time. Abuse is evident, for example, in 1739 
and 1745 Acts requiring that parties actually attend court to be compensated 
for attendance, and limiting the number of days people could "attend" 
court before filing their suits.4" The text of a 1737 Act prohibiting sheriffs 
from bringing lawsuits on behalf of creditors explicitly states that sheriffs 
had increased the litigation rate for their own gain.42 In response to 
complaints of abuse, a 1728 Act required winners of lawsuits to obtain 
approval on bills of costs before the court adjourned.43 
Justices of the peace, also appointed by the governor, individually 
decided debt suits worth less than forty shillings. Justices of the peace 
offered a less formal and less expensive forum for obtaining judgments. 
They usually resided within the same town as the litigants, and heard cases 
year-round in their homes or in taverns." The fees of justices of the peace 
were also set by statute on a per-service basis, but were much lower than 
those of the county courts.45 Litigants could, however, appeal decisions of 
the justices of the peace to the common pleas courts, which would increase 
total litigation fees and delay the execution process.46 
B. Fees and Costs in Colonial Litigation 
How expensive was debt litigation in the colonial courts? Again, 
although scholars have not carefully examined the costs of colonial 
litigation, it is central-though implicit-to the debt-recording 
interpretation of the courts that overall litigation costs were relatively 
modest, especially in cases ending in default. According to the English rule, 
all court costs and fees were borne by the losing party.47 It can be assumed 
that a debtor would voluntarily agree to waive defenses only if the ensuing 
40. See TAYLOR, supra note 4, at 30-3 1. For the English legislative history of the "loser 
pays" system, see 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *399- 
400. 
41. See 2 ACTS AND RESOLVES OF MASSACHUSETTS, supra note 37, at 1005-06, ch. 14; 3 
ACTS AND RESOLVES OF MASSACHUSETTS, supra note 37, at 248, ch. 7. 
42. See 2 ACTS AND RESOLVES OF MASSACHUSETTS, supra note 37, at 794, ch. 3. 
43. See id. at 492, ch. 2. 
44. See DAYTON, supra note 14, at 38. 
45. For the statutes detailing fees of the justices of the peace, see supra note 37 and the 
sources cited therein. For my study of the fees of one justice of the peace, see infra text 
accompanying notes 60-62. As I shall describe infra Part IV, the principal proposal of Regulators 
urging the revamping of the colonial court system was to expand the jurisdiction of justices of the 
peace to reduce court fees. 
46. See NELSON, supra note 21, at 15-16. 
47. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
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costs were modest in comparison to the gain achieved from the creditor, 
either in terms of a lower interest rate or a greater willingness to extend 
credit. Furthermore, the characterization of the colonial courts as 
regularized, modernized, or bureaucratized implies that the overall 
costliness of its operations were low. 
This Section evaluates the costliness of the colonial courts by 
examining all uncontested cases brought on promissory notes and bonds in 
the Plymouth County Court of Common Pleas for two sample sessions, 
March 1740 and April 1783,48 two years in which Massachusetts 
experienced both severe recessions and high levels of uncontested debt 
litigation.49 The Massachusetts records include the actual aggregate fees 
imposed for each case. This Section evaluates litigation costliness in two 
ways. First, it measures, by case, court fees as a percentage of the 
underlying debt in the dispute. Second, it evaluates court fees on an 
absolute basis by comparing the average fees per case to various measures 
of workers' earnings during similar periods. 
Table 1 shows fees as a percentage of underlying debt in debt cases 
ending in default for March 1740 and April 1783, respectively. The Table 
presents averages by case quartiles, ranging from that twenty-five percent 
of all cases involving the lowest debt amounts to that twenty-five percent 
involving the largest debt. The Table also shows the average and median 
percentage of fees to debt for all cases.50 
48. The common pleas courts met four times a year in each county. I chose to examine the 
spring sessions in these sample years because more cases were litigated in winter and spring 
sessions than in the summer. See infra note 89 and accompanying text. 
49. I chose 1783 as a representative pre-Shays' Rebellion year because in 1784 the 
Massachusetts General Court expanded the jurisdiction of justices of the peace over cases 
involving small debt amounts, see infra note 126 and accompanying text, which was likely to 
affect the relationship between fee levels and debt amounts. On recession and litigation conditions 
in 1783, see infra Part IV. For conditions in 1740, see MANN, supra note 14, at 62-63, which 
notes a decline in agricultural prices in 1740, and ROBERT ZEMSKY, MERCHANTS, FARMERS, AND 
RIVER GODS: AN ESSAY IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY AMERICAN POLITICS 117-26 (1971), which 
discusses the monetary crisis of the period. 
50. For a discussion of how the sample was defined, see infra note 84. 
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TABLE 1: COURT FEES AS A PERCENT OF UNDERLYING DEBT IN CASES 
RESULTING IN DEFAULT: 1740, 1783 
March 1740 April 1783 
(130 Cases) (154 Cases) 
Debt Level Debt Level Fees as % Debt Level Fees as % 
Quartile in English of Debt in English of Debt 
Sterling5 l Sterling52 
Lowest < ?1.28 79.0% < ?4.08 59.15% 
3rd ?1.28-2.73 29.6% ?4.08-7.97 24.8% 
2nd ?2.73-5.36 16.0% ?7.97-17.39 12.6% 
Highest > ?5.36 6.5% > ?17.39 5.1% 
Average all debts: 32.6% 25.5% 
Median: 21.7% _ _ _ 16.9% 
Source: 6, 9 PLYMOUTH COURT RECORDS, supra note 16. 
As is evident from Table 1, during the colonial period, court fees for 
cases ending in default were extraordinarily high in comparison to 
underlying debt levels. Fees comprised a substantially higher percentage of 
lower debt amounts because they were fixed regardless of the magnitude of 
debt to be collected.53 Nevertheless, the figures are remarkable. In 1740, for 
example, fees comprised an astounding 79% of debt for the lowest quartile 
of cases. As stated, the sample includes only default cases. Thus, for the 
cases regarding the smallest 25% of debts, debtors who did not appear were 
obliged to pay a 79% premium on top of the magnitude of outstanding debt. 
51. All values were taken from the Plymouth Court Records and converted to English 
Sterling. The values of colonial currencies (which had English Sterling denominations although 
they were independent currencies) fluctuated wildly, particularly during colonial governments' 
experiments with paper money in the first half of the 18th century and during the Revolution. See 
JOHN J. MCCUSKER, MONEY AND EXCHANGE IN EUROPE AND AMERICA, 1600-1775: A 
HANDBOOK, 138-45 tbl.3.1 (1978). English Sterling values were more stable than those of 
colonial currencies during the 18th century, so conversion allows for more meaningful cross- 
comparisons over time. For the purposes of Table 1, I converted the 1740 values to English 
Sterling according to the schedule given in MCCUSKER, supra, at tbl.3. 1. 
52. Converting 1783 values to English Sterling is complex because historians have not yet 
determined the exact commercial exchange rate at the time. The confusion stems from the fact 
that in 1781 the infamous Continental bills were allowed to expire and sterling silver coins were 
briefly the principal money and unit of account in America before conversion to the dollar system. 
For a discussion of the expiration of the Continentals, see E. JAMES FERGUSON, THE POWER OF 
THE PURSE: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN PUBLIC FINANCE, 1776-1790, at 66-69 (1961). I deflated 
the values to Sterling using the par exchange rate, ?133 7s. 6d. Massachusetts money equals ?100 
English Sterling. See MCCUSKER, supra note 51, at 120. This is the current best estimate of the 
exchange rate at the time. See E-mail from John J. McCusker to Claire Priest (Feb. 10, 1999) (on 
file with author). 
53. In one case, fees alone were 158% of the debt. See Demount v. Leonard (Mar. 1740), in 6 
PLYMOUTH COURT RECORDS, supra note 16, at 217 #157. 
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For larger debts, that percentage declined. But even in the second highest 
quartile, fees comprised 16% of outstanding debt. Table 1 shows that the 
average and median court fee percentages for all cases were a substantial 
32.6% and 21.7%, respectively. 
Table 1 also shows that, for 1783, the fee proportions were lower than 
for 1740, but still substantial. Thus, fees comprised 59.15% of the lowest 
quartile of cases, but still 12.6% of the second highest quartile, and 25.5% 
and 16.9% of the average and median case, respectively. 
How expensive were the colonial courts on an absolute basis? Table 2 
shows the relationship between the average fees for an uncontested debt 
case and various measures of contemporary wages. To make these 
calculations, I used the average and median fees of those cases examined in 
Table 1 and compared them to estimates of wages at approximately the 
same time.54 
TABLE 2: MEDIAN AND AVERAGE COURT FEES IN CASES RESULTING IN 
DEFAULT AS COMPARED TO WAGES: 1735-1754, 1781-1782 
Wages 1735-1754 Wages 1781-1782 
Occupation Labor Cost* Occupation Labor Cost* 
Seaman .47, .49 month Unskilled labor 19.7, 21.0 days 
_________________ 
_________________(fall) 




Skilled Craftsman 5.7, 5.8 days Master 9.2, 9.8 days 
Tradesman 
*Plymouth court fees in English Sterling (median, average): March 1740 (136.4 
pence, 140.3 pence); April 1783 (310.4 pence, 331.28 pence). 
Source: See infra notes 55, 56, and 59 and accompanying text. 
Relying on account books and probate records from scattered counties 
throughout Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Connecticut, economic 
historian Gloria L. Main estimates that average daily wages in the period 
1735 to 1754 were 24.0 pence Sterling for skilled craftsmen and 17.5 pence 
Sterling for farm laborers.55 Gary B. Nash reports that in 1740 Boston 
54. There are no exactly comparable statistics on income or wages across these two periods. 
As in Table 1, all values have been converted to English Sterling, which was more stable than 
colonial money, to reduce the degree to which these comparisons would be distorted by inflation 
across the two periods. 
55. See Gloria L. Main, Gender, Work, and Wages in Colonial New England, 51 WM. & 
MARY Q. 39, 48 tbl.Ill (1994). The average daily wage for the period 1630 to 1774 was 18.3 
pence Sterling for skilled craftsmen and 16.4 pence Sterling for farm laborers. See id. The average 
daily wage for women and girls was 7.3 pence Sterling and for boys (general labor) was 11.2 
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seamen received ?1.2 Sterling per month in wages.56 Converted to English 
Sterling values,57 the April 1740 court fees averaged 140.3 pence Sterling, 
with a median of 136.4 pence Sterling. According to these figures, then, to 
satisfy the average court fee in 1740, a skilled craftsmen would have to 
work 5.7-5.8 days; and a farmer 7.8-8.0 days. Court fees alone for a typical 
uncontested debt suit in Plymouth County consumed 47%-49% of a Boston 
seaman's monthly income. These figures are conservative because, during a 
year of recession, such as 1740, wages (though not fees) dropped 
radically.58 The drop in wages on account of the recession is not totally 
reflected in the wage data presented here. 
Although the comparisons are not exact, the absolute level of court fees 
appears even higher in the period preceding Shays' Rebellion. Robert 
Taylor reports that, in 1781, Northampton paid master tradesmen 45 pence 
(33.74 pence Sterling) per day for summer labor and, in 1782, paid 28 
pence (20.99 pence Sterling) and 21 pence (15.75 pence Sterling) per day 
for unskilled labor in the summer and fall, respectively.59 In 1783, the 
average and median Plymouth court fees were 331.28 pence and 310.4 
pence, respectively. In the 1780s, then, for a master tradesmen, average 
court costs in an uncontested debt action consumed the income of 9.2-9.8 
days; for unskilled labor, 14.8-15.8 days in the summer and 19.7-21.0 
days-between two and three weeks of a six-day work week-in the fall. 
Finally, as mentioned, the fees for proceeding before a justice of the 
peace were lower than for proceeding before the court of common pleas. 
They still were substantial, however, both as a percentage of the underlying 
debt and in absolute terms. To examine the differences, I relied on the 
records of a justice of the peace who practiced in Massachusetts during the 
period 1734 to 1761.60 In a pool of eighteen cases from the period 1755 to 
pence Sterling. See id. Main indexed prices to Sterling to account for both inflation and changing 
grain prices, since wages were sometimes paid in " country pay" -corn designated as commodity 
money. See id. at 46-47 n.24. 
56. See GARY B. NASH, THE URBAN CRUCIBLE: SOCIAL CHANGE, POLITICAL 
CONSCIOUSNESS, AND THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 392-94 tbf.2 (1979). Nash 
reports the statistic in months; it is not evident how many days seamen worked per month. 
57. I converted values in Massachusetts money to Sterling according to the exchange rate 
schedule in MCCUSKER, supra note 51, at 138-45 tbl.3.1. 
58. For a discussion of the decline in wages during the recessions of the eighteenth century, 
see Joseph A. Ernst, "The Labourers Have Been the Greatest Sufferers": The Truck System in 
Early Eighteenth-Century Massachusetts, in MERCHANT CREDIT AND LABOUR STRATEGIES IN 
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 16 (Rosemary E. Ommer ed., 1990). 
59. See TAYLOR, supra note 4, at 195 n.56. According to Taylor, these wages are similar to 
those paid by other towns. See id. As discussed supra note 52, 1780s Sterling values were 
calculated according to the par exchange rate: ?133 7s. 6.d Massachusetts money equals ?100 
English Sterling. 
60. See RECORDS OF THE COURT OF NATHANIEL HARRIS-ONE OF HIS MAJESTY'S JUSTICES 
OF THE PEACE WITHIN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MIDDLESEX-HOLDEN AT WATERTOWN FROM 
1734 TO 1761 (Watertown, Mass., Historical Soc'y of Watertown 1893). 
1999] Colonial Courts 2429 
1761, the median fee represents 53% of the median debt.61 Again, relying 
on Gloria Main's wage estimates,62 the average and median fees consumed 
the income earned in 4.4-4.6 days of skilled labor and in 4.5-4.8 days of 
farm labor. The fees of justices of the peace, therefore, were lower than 
those of the court of common pleas, but remained extremely high in relation 
to the value of the debt involved and in absolute terms. 
The findings here of high litigation costs raise substantial doubt about 
the debt-recording interpretation of colonial courts. First, it is not generally 
plausible that debtors would voluntarily consent to accept a burden in fees 
of up to 59% or 79% in small debt cases or from 16.9% to 21.7% at the 
median, in addition to the underlying debt, simply because of the efficiency 
of the debt collection process. Given these consequences, to voluntarily 
confess judgment or to allow judgment to enter by default is only likely to 
occur where something substantial is at stake and where the effort to collect 
a debt is real, not ministerial. Moreover, to characterize a system attended 
by costs of these magnitudes as "rationalized" and as a "recording 
device"63 seems misdescriptive. The costs attending resort to the colonial 
courts were substantial, both absolutely and in comparison to the 
underlying amounts in dispute. By contrast, the cost of perfecting a security 
interest in Massachusetts today is $10.00, representing less than two hours 
labor at the minimum wage."M Far from the modest administration charges 
of a regularized bureaucracy, court fees in debt cases constituted a 
significant proportion of a colonial Massachusetts resident's weekly and 
even monthly wages. 
III. LITIGATION TIMING IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY MASSACHUSETTS 
It may be assumed that creditors in the colonial period were interested 
in maximizing the return on their investments, which is to say, obviously, 
repayment over nonpayment of their debts. The debt-recording 
interpretation of the colonial court system proposes that creditors 
maximized returns by gaining security through a debtors' confession of 
judgment or a default judgment immediately after extending the debt. 
Judgments provided creditors with the security that they could easily 
61. All fees were converted to Sterling on the basis of McCusker's schedule, see supra note 
51, which allows precision by month. 
62. See Main, supra note 55, at 49 tbl.Jll. 
63. See supra text accompanying notes 25, 30. 
64. See Secretary of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Corporations Division, 
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) Information (last modified Jan. 22, 1998) 
<http:llwww.magnet.state.ma.us/sec/cor/corucc/uccinf.htm#ucc8>. Of course, the costs of 
enforcing a security interest and collecting on a debt are higher, but that is the point. 
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liquidate the debt-by means of a simple execution procedure on the 
debtor's possessions-at any time desirable to the creditor.65 
Part II suggested that the debt-recording interpretation of the courts is 
inconsistent with the high level of fees associated with colonial debt 
litigation. This Part examines the impact of those high fees on litigation 
timing. Section A analyzes the disincentives to litigation created by the fee 
structure. As I shall argue, although immediate litigation expedited the 
process of repossession and gave a creditor a lead over a debtor's other 
creditors, by burdening the debtor with court costs, it increased the 
likelihood of default. As a consequence, the determinants of litigation 
timing are much more complex than have been appreciated. Section B 
examines litigation timing in the Plymouth courts empirically. 
A. The Impact of the Colonial Fee Structure on Litigation Timing 
Colonial merchants and traders as well as farmers relied heavily on 
credit.' By the 1730s, credit was typically extended on promissory notes,67 
bonds,68 and book accounts. At the purchase of goods, a merchant or trader 
typically gave the seller a note or a bond and repaid with goods or money 
(often both) at a later time. Different markets dictated different terms of 
credit. Secondary accounts claim that English merchants customarily sold 
goods to their colonial counterparts on twelve-month credit terms.69 In 
order to pay their English debts on time, New England merchants and 
traders offered goods locally on shorter credit terms. Though these 
estimates appear equally impressionistic, historians describe the customary 
65. On colonial execution procedures, see, for example, 1 ACTS AND RESOLVES OF 
MASSACHUSETTS, supra note 37, at 372-75, ch. 4 (1700 Act describing procedures); 2 ACTS AND 
RESOLVES OF MASSACHUSETTS, supra note 37, at 838-39, ch. 19 (1737 Act specifying 
procedures); and id. at 1095, ch. 22 (1742 Act specifying procedures). 
66. Virginia Hamngton estimates that, prior to the Revolution, one-half to three-quarters of 
an average New York merchant's business transactions were on credit. See VIRGINIA D. 
HARRINGTON, THE NEW YORK MERCHANTS ON THE EVE OF THE REVOLUTION 103 (1935). 
67. Promissory notes were signed written promises to perform a condition or pay a sum of 
money (like a check or IOU). See MANN, supra note 14, at 29. Notes were assignable and could 
circulate throughout a community as a currency. See Frederick K. Beutel, Colonial Sources of the 
Negotiable Instruments Law of the United States, 34 ILL. L. REV. Nw. U. 137, 141 (1939). 
68. Conditional bonds were written sealed instruments by which debtors agreed to pay sums 
of money, which would become void if specific conditions were performed. See MANN, supra 
note 14, at 28-29; Zechariah Chafee, Jr., The Suffolk County Court and Its Jurisdiction, 
Introduction to RECORDS OF THE SUFFOLK COUNTY COURT, 1671-1680, 29 PUBLICATIONS 
COLONIAL SOC'Y MASS. at xxxviii-xl (1933). 
69. See HARRINGTON, supra note 66, at 101; 1 KENNETH WIGGINS PORTER, THE JACKSONS 
AND THE LEES: TWO GENERATIONS OF MASSACHUSETTS MERCHANTS, 1765-1844, at 14, 478 
(1937); JAMES F. SHEPARD & GARY M. WALTON, SHIPPING, MARITIME TRADE, AND THE 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF COLONIAL NORTH AMERICA 131 (1972). Dutch merchants 
generally required payment in 3 months. See HARRINGTON, supra note 66, at 101. Substantial 
premiums were given for cash purchases. See id. at 102-03. 
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terms of credit extended to local retailers as ranging from six to twelve 
months, and possibly less.70 No matter what the credit terms, however, due 
dates were not typically specified. Most frequently, creditors opted to retain 
discretion over legal due dates by specifying that the debt was due "on 
demand."71 This gave them the option, if they so chose, to sue immediately 
after extending the debt. 
Assuming that a creditor's monetary needs remained constant 
throughout the period of outstanding debt, the colonial fee-structure created 
a disincentive to litigate immediately to record a debt through a default 
judgment against the debtor. As mentioned, when creditors went through 
the legal process to obtain default judgments, they imposed substantial 
costs on debtors: The debtor had to pay both the debt and court costs.72 The 
effect of imposing these costs on debtors was similar to increasing the 
magnitude of debt in a given agreement or, when expressed as above as a 
percentage of debt, similar to increasing the interest rate. As described 
above, the Plymouth data reveal that average court costs represented 32.6% 
and 25.5%, respectively, of the median 1740 and 1783 debt amounts in 
cases ending in default, and for lower amounts as much as 79% or even 
more.73 Thus, assuming a full twelve-month loan, litigation was equivalent 
to increasing the interest rate on those debts by 32.6%, 25.5%, or even 79%. 
While increasing the magnitude of debt is obviously harmful to debtors, 
it is not clearly equally beneficial to creditors. Increasing the debt burden 
directly increases the chance of debtor default.74 Imposing court costs on 
the debtor reduces what is available as repayment to the creditor. The fees 
themselves went to judicial officials; the creditor gained only priority and 
ease of execution. In addition, increasing the magnitude of debt changes 
debtors' incentives. When the interest rate or debt burden rises, the chance 
that debtors will be able to profit from low-risk investments declines, and 
debtors willing to borrow at that rate are more likely to invest in high-risk 
investments, leading to greater rates of default.75 Thus, given the high costs 
and fees attending colonial litigation, imposing court costs on debtors 
70. See HARRINGTON, supra note 66, at 101 (suggesting between 3 and 12 months as the 
customary terms for domestic credit); JAMES H. SOLTOW, THE ECONOMIC ROLE OF 
WILLIAMSBURG 133 (1965) (describing customary domestic credit terms as between 6 and 12 
months). 
71. When due dates were specified, it was typically to set a date at which interest would 
begin accruing. See, e.g., Letter from Bourryau & Schaffer to Thomas Hancock (Feb. 6, 1743), 
reprinted in W.T. BAXTER, HOUSE OF HANCOCK: BUSINESS IN BOSTON, 1724-1775, at 219 (1945) (allowing Hancock 6 months credit and requesting 5% interest thereafter); HARRINGTON, 
supra note 66, at 102 (describing both credit agreements in which interest began accruing 
immediately, and after 6 months). 
72. See supra text accompanying note 40. 
73. See supra Table 1 & note 53. 
74. See, e.g., Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Causes and Consequences of the Dependence of Quality 
on Price, 25 J. EcON. LIT. 1, 6-7 (1987). 
75. See id. 
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increased the chance of default with no direct monetary benefit to creditors. 
It is, therefore, not obvious that debt litigation would be brought principally 
for recording or bureaucratic reasons, as opposed to a real economic desire 
to collect the debt. 
There may be separate reasons, of course, for creditors to sue 
immediately or shortly after extending debts. Creditors might litigate 
immediately when, for example, they gain new and adverse information 
about debtors' liquidity unknown when the credit was extended. Similarly, 
a creditor might desire an immediate default judgment upon the fear that the 
debtor will be sued by other creditors. Any money or goods that other 
creditors obtained from the assets of a financially troubled or insolvent 
debtor would decrease the assets available to all other creditors. Finally, 
creditors might sue immediately if they themselves suffer unexpected 
economic reverses compelling a greater demand for their own liquidity. 
In most county court cases, however, immediate litigation was not 
likely to be desirable under the colonial fee structure. Rather than propel 
default by imposing the burden of court costs on the debtor, creditors were 
likely to wait to litigate until obtaining a credible signal that a debtor's 
investments were not resulting in profitable returns, or that the debtor was 
about to be sued by other creditors. Thus, in an environment where 
creditors customarily extended credit on a six to twelve month basis, it is 
likely that creditors would typically initiate lawsuits only after six to twelve 
months, when they learned that they would not be voluntarily repaid. 
As mentioned, justices of the peace resolved disputes involving less 
than forty shillings and charged less for their services. Lower fees reduced 
the disincentive to litigate. It is likely, therefore, that creditors obtained 
default judgments against debtors more quickly when the debt fell within 
the jurisdictional amount of the justices of the peace. 
The hypothesis that creditors were reluctant to bring debt litigation in 
the absence of an actual or potential default is confirmed by contemporary 
accounts. Virginia Harrington's examination of New York merchants' 
business records reveals, for example, that businessmen were extremely 
reluctant to sue and that inquiries concerning a debtor's solvency were kept 
very quiet so that other creditors would not litigate first.76 Merchants 
usually went to great lengths to find solutions to avoid litigation.7 James 
Soltow' s study of Virginia merchants suggests that, before litigating, 
creditors tried to gain security through an alternative use of conditioned 
bonds. When a debtor failed to pay a debt on time, a creditor might require 
76. See HARRINGTON, supra note 66, at 119. 
77. See id. at 120-21 (describing the emergence of a "foreign attachment" system, the 
"essence of [which] is the ability of the creditor to attach the property of the alleged debtor, 
wherever it could be found, without formal judgment in court"). 
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the debtor (under threat of litigation) to enter a bond agreement, attaching 
real estate or property as collateral and requiring the signatures of 
guarantors.78 Litigation, according to Soltow, was "a last resort."79 W.T. 
Baxter's review of the debt collection practices of the Hancock family in 
Massachusetts led him to conclude similarly that " [almost every account 
tells the same long-drawn-out story of dawdle and delay."80 These 
accounts, of course, are anecdotal, and have yet to be empirically examined. 
B. Empirical Evidence on Litigation Timing in Plymouth 
As mentioned, the debt-recording interpretation of colonial courts has 
not been supported by direct empirical study of litigation timing but, rather, 
is merely an interpretation of the discovery of the high percentage of default 
judgments in debt cases beginning in the 1720s and 1730s.8' This Section 
looks at the question directly. It examines 5048 cases in the Plymouth Court 
of Common Pleas over two periods: 1724 to 175082 and 1781 to 1786. The 
first half of the eighteenth century has been the focus of the debt-recording 
school.83 The period 1781 to 1786 marks the time from the courts' 
reopening after the Revolution until Shays' Rebellion. 
The Section precisely measures the number of days between the date 
the debtor signed the note or sealed the bond and the date the creditor filed 
suit against the debtor in court.84 The Plymouth County court records 
provide a signing or sealing date for almost every note and bond, as well as 
an exact court filing date. This study principally focuses on default 
judgments-the central focus of the debt-recording interpretation- 
although it also examines the timing of litigation in those cases where 
78. See SOLTOW, supra note 70, at 140-42; Rosen, supra note 28, at 233; see also MANN, 
supra note 14, at 103, 112-15 (describing the use of penal bonds to secure arbitration awards). 
79. SOLTOW, supra note 70, at 142. 
80. BAXTER, supra note 71, at 192. 
81. See supra text accompanying notes 22-25. 
82. Data from 1718 are also included in the average and median calculations. There were too 
few cases during the period 1719 to 1723 to merit inclusion. 
83. See supra text accompanying notes 19-35. 
84. This Note's empirical sections rely on a subsection of cases found in the records of the 
Plymouth Court of Common Pleas. The data set includes all cases brought on promissory notes, 
bonds, or other written credit instruments where a date of agreement was included (a small 
minority with no recorded date or with incomplete dates, e.g., no month or day were excluded). 
Although book accounts were a widely-used form of debt instrument, the records do not include 
dates of agreement for book account cases, so I excluded these cases from the study. I also 
excluded litigation on all government matters, such as cases brought by the Town Loan 
commissioners, for fear that the timing of these lawsuits was determined by political processes 
rather than by more typical economic forces. Also important, the date of litigation always refers to 
the date the case originally was filed. No cases continued from a prior term were included. To 
generate values on the timing of litigation, I entered the data on a spreadsheet hat can calculate 
among all days since 1600, accounting for variations by months and in leap years. 
2434 The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 108: 2413 
defendants appeared in court and confessed judgment against themselves 
(only thirty-four of the entire sample).85 
Subsection 1 presents the data on the number of cases filed immediately 
or soon after execution of the debt. Subsection 2 presents data describing 
the timing of debt litigation in Plymouth in cases ending in defaults and 
confession of judgment more broadly. Subsection 3 examines the timing of 
litigation in a justice of the peace court. 
1. Empirical Supportfor the Debt-Recording Interpretation of 
Colonial Courts 
The debt-recording interpretation implies that creditors sought default 
judgments against debtors immediately or soon after extending the debt. 
Thomas Russell, building on the interpretation, suggests that, as early as the 
eighteenth century, creditors may have obtained default judgments against 
debtors on the same day that the debt was extended.86 But the debt- 
recording hypothesis need not be defined this strictly. First, county court 
sessions met quarterly; thus, cases brought within the first quarter following 
execution of the debt may still confirm the hypothesis.87 Second, although 
not described in any of the literature, I have discovered a number of cases 
in which the date the debt was allegedly signed occurred after the date the 
suit was filed in court, which is to say, that the note or bond was post-dated 
for purposes of the litigation. Though somewhat peculiar, these cases 
certainly seem to support the proposition that creditors and debtors colluded 
in debt litigation for purposes of facilitating debt collection. 
The evidence from Plymouth County, however, does not generally 
support the debt-recording interpretation. First, aggregating cases filed on 
or prior to the reported date of execution (a very small number) along with 
cases filed within the first quarter following execution, during the period 
1724 to 1750, only 4.6% (163 of 3517) of all uncontested debt cases were 
litigated at the first court date available. During the period 1781 to 1786, a 
slightly higher percentage, 6.1% (94 of 1531), were litigated at the first 
possible court session. These figures may provide support for the 
proposition that some creditors did, in fact, use the colonial courts for 
recording purposes, although they may reflect collection on short-term debt. 
85. I kept separate records of default and non-default cases. For the period 1718 and 1724 to 
1750, there were 3517 cases with default judgments; and 452 cases without them. From 1781 to 
1786, there were 1531 cases with default judgments; and 45 cases without them. Non-default 
judgment cases include cases that were contested leading to a jury trial; cases where parties 
referred the matter to arbitrators; and nonsuit determinations, where plaintiffs failed to appear. 
86. See Russell, supra note 31, at 362-63. 
87. For this purpose, I have indicated cases filed within 92 days of execution of the debt. 
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Cases brought before the alleged execution date represent less than one 
percent of all cases. For the period 1724 to 1750, of 3517 uncontested 
cases, only ten were brought before the alleged signing date. In the period 
1781 to 1786, of 1531 uncontested cases, eight were brought before the 
signing date. These numbers are too low to conclude that creditors and 
debtors often agreed to post-date bonds and notes to allow creditors to sue. 
They do reveal, however, that post-dating credit instruments was a legally 
available avenue that was not used in the vast majority of cases. 
Perhaps the debt-recording interpretation should be further relaxed by 
considering cases brought within two court sessions of debt execution (six 
months), rather than one. Common pleas courts met only in one town in 
each county,88 and it may have been hard for creditors to appear at the first 
possible session. In addition, the Plymouth Records reveal that more cases 
were brought during the winter than during the summer harvest months, 
suggesting that creditors may have been reluctant or unable to go to court 
during the harvest season.89 An extension of this nature is problematic, 
however, even according to the debt-recording view, since extending the 
period of time prior to recording the debt multiplies the likelihood that the 
debtor will obtain additional credit and that those or preexisting creditors 
may record their debts earlier. Of course, an extension to six months also 
confounds the identification of recording with legitimate efforts to collect 
three- or six-month debt obligations. 
Even if one considers a broader period, the data do not provide strong 
support for the debt-recording interpretation. In the period 1724 to 1750, an 
additional 9.6% (339 of 3517) of cases were brought between three and six 
months of debt execution. In the period 1781 to 1786, 11.2% (171 of 1531) 
were brought between three and six months. At best, then, ignoring the 
possibility that these cases (or some substantial portion of them) represent 
legitimate efforts to collect short-term debt, the debt-recording 
interpretation of colonial courts explains no more than 5% to 7% of all debt 
cases, including those brought within three months, and 15% to 18% of all 
cases, including those brought within six months.90 
88. In Plymouth County, the common pleas court sat quarterly in the town of Plymouth. See 
NELSON, supra note 13, at 23. 
89. Of course, it is also possible that creditors typically litigated in the winter because most 
farmers' debts were due after the harvest, making the winter the appropriate time to file suit 
against defaulting debtors. 
90. Thomas Russell estimates that concomitant litigation and lending occurred in 34.9% of 
cases in South Carolina in the period from 1820 to 1840. See Russell, supra note 31, at 352. 
Certainly, this difference of 20% to 30% between the 18th and 19th centuries suggests substantial 
differences between the colonial and 19th century legal environments. Russell's estimate may 
misrepresent he extent of concomitant litigation and lending, however, because he assumes that 
all cases in which defendants confessed judgment occurred on the day that their debts were 
extended. 
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2. The Timing of Litigation and the Function of the Colonial Courts 
a. Cases Ending in Default Judgments 
Table 3 departs from the debt-recording interpretation and describes 
litigation timing more broadly. It shows the proportion of all debt cases 
resulting in default judgments filed at various intervals following execution 
of the debt. As can be seen in the Table, there is a wide distribution with 
respect to the period between execution and litigation to collect both in the 
1724 to 1750 and 1781 to 1786 periods. As described above, 14.5% and 
17.9% of cases were litigated within six months of execution in the periods 
1724 to 1750 and 1781 to 1786, respectively. A substantially greater 
proportion, 21.4% and 22.9%, respectively, were litigated within the 
succeeding six months. The Table shows, in fact, that roughly half of all 
cases were litigated between six months and two years after execution 
(48.8% and 48.7%, respectively), and 60% between six months to three 
years (62.9% and 57.8%, respectively). The median period between debt 
execution and suit for all cases is 17.5 months during the period 1724 to 
1750, and 14.0 months during 1781 to 1786. 
TABLE 3: THE TIMING OF LITIGATION IN DEBT CASES RESULTING IN 
DEFAULT: 1724 TO 1750, 1781 TO 1786 
Period following 1724 to 1750 1781 to 1786 
Execution (3,517 cases) (1,531 cases) 
< 3 months 4.9% 6.7% 
3 to 6 months 9.6% 11.2% 
Total 6 Months or Less 14.5% 17.9% 
6 to 12 months 21.4% 22.9% 
J to 2 years 27.4% 25.8% 
2to3 years 14.1% 9.1% 
Total 6 Months to 3 62.9% 57.8% 
Years 
3to5years 11.7% 7.1% 
S to IO years 8.0% 9.4% 
> 10 years 2.9% 7.8% 
Total Over 3 Years 22.6% 24.3% 
Median Interval 531.5 days 427 days 
Execution to Suit 17.5 months 14.0 months 
Source: 5-7, 9-10 PLYMoUTH COURT REcoRDs, supra note 16. 
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These figures suggest that debt litigation in the colonial courts 
represents a genuine effort to collect debt, rather than mere debt recording. 
As discussed above, historians report that debts in the colonies were 
customarily extended on a six- to twelve-month basis. If so, most litigation 
occurred within a short time (within two or three court sessions) after the 
debtor failed to pay when due. Data on the exact terms of underlying 
colonial credit is unavailable.91 The 21.4% and 22.9% of cases in Table 3 
litigated within six to twelve months of execution, however, are likely to 
represent debts extended on shorter credit terms. Similarly, the 27.4% and 
25.8% of cases in Table 3 litigated within one to two years of execution are 
likely to represent suits to collect on debts extended on a twelve-month 
basis. 
Some credit agreements did specify explicitly a date on which the debt 
was due. The timing of cases based on these credit instruments supports the 
proposition that creditors litigated within six to nine months of default. In 
the periods 1724 to 1750 and 1781 to 1786, respectively, 362 cases (of 
3517) and 330 cases (of 1531) were brought involving credit instruments 
providing a specific due date. Although not indicated in Table 3, for these 
cases, the median interval between the specified due date and litigation was 
212 days, or 6.99 months for the period 1724 to 1750, and 254 days, or 8.35 
months, for the period 1781 to 1786. These figures serve as a good proxy 
for the timing of cases even when a due date was not specified: Creditors 
litigated within two to three court sessions after debtors' defaults. 
What about the cases indicated in Table 3 that remained outstanding for 
over three years? Debts litigated after three years can be explained in 
several ways. First, in many cases, delayed litigation related to the nature of 
the credit instruments involved. As described above, bonds were at times 
used to extend credit on a more secured basis to defaulting debtors.92 
Second, in some cases, creditors agreed to postpone debt litigation in order 
to increase the ultimate chances of collecting the debt. As mentioned, 
historians have found extensive evidence that creditors tried to find ways to 
collect without litigation, such as with deferred payment plans, postponing 
litigation as long as possible.93 Third, in the colonial period, debt 
91. For references to existing work by historians examining colonial merchants' records, see 
supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text. None provides a good estimate of credit terms within 
the colonial economy overall. 
92. See supra text accompanying note 78. It is unclear from the court records, however, what 
percentage of bond cases correspond to this arrangement. During the period 1724 to 1750, 60% of 
all uncontested cases involved bonds and 37% involved notes. After the Revolution, notes 
dominated the dockets (96% of all cases concerned notes). 
93. See supra text accompanying notes 76-79. Indeed, the high costs of colonial litigation, 
even if levied entirely against the debtor, encouraged this approach. These accounts suggest why 
some debts may have remained outstanding for several years, although the Plymouth evidence, to 
a great extent, suggests that historians have overstated the extent to which merchants deferred 
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obligations represented a principal form of savings, which may have led 
colonists to hold on to bonds and notes for long periods of time.94 
b. Cases Ending in Confessions of Judgment 
According to the debt-recording interpretation of colonial litigation, 
cases in which defendants confessed judgment against themselves represent 
litigation for the purpose of recording and securing debts perhaps even 
more clearly than cases ending in default judgments.95 The fact that debtors 
confessed judgment in court suggests that these cases were brought with 
debtors' consent, purely to give the creditor greater security; presumably, 
otherwise the debtor would have paid the debt. Table 4 presents data on the 
median interval of time between debt execution and litigation in cases 
where debtors confessed judgment. Table 4 suggests that the debt-recording 
interpretation of confession of judgment cases in the county courts is not 
fully explanatory. 
TABLE 4: THE TIMING OF LITIGATION I CONFESSION OF JUDGMENT CASES 
1724-1750 1781-1786 
(30 cases) (4 cases) 
Median Interval 1549.5 days 390.5 days 
Agreement Date to Suit: 48.0 months 12.8 months 
Source: 5-7, 9-10 PLYMouTH COuRT RECORDS, supra note 16. 
As is shown in Table 4, in the median confession of judgment case 
during the period 1724 to 1750, the time between debt execution and 
litigation was approximately four years, as compared to 17.5 months in the 
median default judgment case during the same period, as is shown in Table 
3. During the period 1781 to 1786, in the median of the four cases where 
defendants confessed judgment, the period of time between debt execution 
and litigation was 12.8 months, closely similar to the median default case, 
litigated 14.0 months after execution. Clearly, in Massachusetts before the 
Confession Act,96 confession of judgment cases cannot be characterized as 
litigation. Table 3 shows that 77.4% and 75.7% of all debt cases, respectively, were litigated 
within three years of the extension of the debt. 
94. See ALICE HANSON JONES, WEALTH OF A NATION To BE: THE AMERICAN COLONIES ON 
THE EVE OF THE REVOLUTION 127-34 (photo. reprint 1997) (1980) (discussing the importance of 
outstanding debt obligations to the assessment of colonists' net worth). 
95. See MANN, supra note 14, at 40; Rosen, supra note 28, at 234. 
96. As we shall see in Section IV.D, the Confession Act of 1786 required all debtors to 
confess judgment to record debts at the outset of litigation. Thus, in some contexts, confession of judgment cases may signal an effort to record and secure debts. 
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special cases in which debtors consented to be sued for the purpose of 
recordation. Debtors confessed judgment in cases where creditors had 
waited to litigate as long, or longer, than in cases where debtors defaulted. 
3. The Timing of Litigation in the Justices' Courts 
Finally, the timing of litigation in cases before a justice of the peace 
was radically different. Harris's records reveal that, for the eighteen cases 
he decided, the median period between debt execution and suit was 150.5 
days (5.0 months) and the average period, 215.7 days (7.1 months).97 Table 
3 shows in comparison that the median period between execution and suit 
in the court of common pleas was 531.5 days (17.5 months). There are good 
reasons for these differences. Justices' fees were lower, though not 
insubstantial,98 reducing the disincentives toward early suit. In addition to 
lower fees, justices typically resided in the same town as the litigants; 
creditors, therefore, were not as restricted in choosing when to sue as before 
the quarterly common pleas sessions. Third, justices of the peace decided 
cases involving small sums of money. If debts for small sums were 
typically extended on shorter credit terms, then this would also explain why 
cases were brought earlier in the justices' courts. 
Along with the fee data presented in Part II, the litigation timing data 
displayed here show that colonial debt litigation was motivated principally 
by the real economic ambition of collecting debt. The debt-recording 
interpretation is not generally available for the large majority of debt cases. 
The high costs of debt litigation complicated a creditor's collection 
strategies, principally by creating a strong incentive to delay litigation. 
Based upon this understanding of the operation of colonial debt 
litigation, Part IV examines more carefully the grounds of Shays' Rebellion 
and the effects of the reforms introduced in response. As we shall see, 
external economic forces might increase liquidity pressures, both increasing 
the extent of default and increasing creditors' demand for repayment 
sufficient to justify the high costs of litigation. Earlier historical accounts 
well recognize that Shays' Rebellion represented an attack on the courts, 
motivated by concerns about debt litigation and high court costs. The 
underlying basis for the Rebellion in terms of the conduct of debt litigation, 
however, has not been fully explored. Part IV reviews the historical 
accounts of the Rebellion and then examines litigation data to provide a 
deeper understanding of the crisis. 
97. Note that the sample size here is very small (18 cases) because of the infrequency with 
which Harris recorded a signing or sealing date. 
98. See supra text accompanying note 61. 
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IV. SHAYS' REBELLION: LmIGATION TRENDS DURING RECESSION AND 
THE IMPACT OF COURT REFORM 
In 1786 and 1787, the Regulators engaged in violent protests 
throughout New England, closing the common pleas courts in seven 
Massachusetts counties and temporarily suspending debt-collection.99 By 
the end of 1786, the insurgents numbered 9000,1? and the Federalists 
viewed the rebellion as posing a threat to constitutionalism and 
democracy.101 Shays' Rebellion arose out of an economic climate of severe 
recession and extreme monetary deflation, but it was propelled by what the 
Regulators perceived to be an inadequate legislative response to the burdens 
imposed on the citizenry, particularly with respect to those owing private 
debts. Although violence was focused in the years 1786 and 1787, 
understanding Shays' Rebellion requires an examination of the postwar 
economic problems, the legislative responses that Regulators perceived as 
inadequate, and the effect of economic conditions and remedial legislation 
on litigation trends. Section A examines the economic conditions that 
motivated mass protest in Massachusetts. Section B describes legislative 
responses to the Regulators' demands. Section C analyzes how litigation 
volume and the timing of litigation transform during periods of deflation 
and recession and surveys trends in litigation in Plymouth, Massachusetts 
between 1781 and 1786. Finally, Section D examines the adoption of a 
debt-recording regime in response to the Rebellion. 
A. Economic Conditions in Massachusetts, 1781 to 1790 
There were three principal contributing factors to the depression of the 
1780s: economic stagnation, heavy taxes, and the removal of Continental 
bills, which caused a return to reliance on gold and silver coins as 
currency.'02 The effects of economic recession were felt as early as 1780 
when the center of wartime activity shifted to the South. The closure of 
trade with the West Indies deprived New England of its principal outlet for 
99. See SZATMARY, supra note 4, at 58-59. The Regulators closed courts in Northampton, 
Worcester, Concord, Great Barrington, Springfield, and Berkshire counties, and Taunton in 
Bristol County. See id. 
100. See id. at 59. 
101. See JACKSON TURNER MAIN, THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS: CRITICS OF THE CONSTITUTION, 
1781-1788, at 59-64 (1974); JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN 
THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 33-34 (1996); GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE 
AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 325-28 (1998). 
102. The factors contributing to the post-American Revolution recession are widely discussed 
in historical scholarship. See, for example, MCCUSKER & MENARD, supra note 34, at 367-77, for 
a more detailed description of economic conditions after the Revolution. For a discussion of 
problems generated by currency and the need to pay federal and state debts in the aftermath of the 
war, see FERGUSON, supra note 52, at 179-219. 
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agricultural and timber exports.103 New England's shipping and fishing 
industries became almost entirely stagnant and were not revived to former 
levels until long after the War."04 
Severe recession began in 1779 and 1780, when state governments 
actively pursued plans to remedy the crisis conditions relating to their 
wartime debts. The first priority was to bring an end to the hyperinflation 
plaguing state economies. States had resorted to financing their operations 
through the voluminous issuance of paper money. The money had little 
backing and, beginning in 1776, the value of bills rapidly depreciated while 
prices skyrocketed.105 In 1780, Massachusetts suddenly extinguished the 
paper money by repealing the 1776 Tender Act, which had made the 
Continentals legal tender for the purposes of private and public debts."0 
The Continentals depreciated to insignificant values, forcing an immediate 
return to a hard money system, and requiring debtors to pay creditors the 
nominal value of their debts in specie.107 Thus, for the first time since 1775, 
debtors were required to pay debts in gold and silver coins, rather than in 
money that had rapidly lost value. 
Pressed by a sense that a return to political normalcy required 
extinguishing public debt, the Massachusetts General Court imposed taxes 
totaling ?17,878,706 in 1780, initiating a period of extreme recession.108 
Massachusetts adopted a uniquely strict reimbursement policy that 
historians have viewed as a windfall to public creditors."0 The General 
Court paid its debts in specie amounts corresponding to the value of the 
debt before depreciation. Creditors who had lent the government 
Continentals during the war, for example, were paid back an amount 
corresponding to the value of those bills at the time they were issued, rather 
than at the time of the debt. Moreover, Massachusetts paid interest on these 
debts in specie.1 
The economic recession worsened in the period 1781 to 1784. In 1781, 
the General Court levied an extremely unpopular excise tax on wines, 
liquors, tea, coaches and other luxury items.111 The General Court imposed 
?200,000 in general taxes in both 1782 and 1783, and ?140,000 in 1784, 
and the accumulated effect of four years of heavy tax burdens quickly drove 
103. See MCCUSKER & MENARD, supra note 34, at 370. 
104. See TAYLOR, supra note 4, at 103-04. 
105. See FERGUSON, supra note 52, at 59; Charles W. Calomiris, Institutional Failure, 
Monetary Scarcity, and the Depreciation of the Continental, 48 J. ECON. HIST. 47 (1988). 
106. See TAYLOR, supra note 4, at 106. 
107. See id. at 105-07. 
108. See id. at 108, 122, 132. 
109. See, e.g., FERGUSON, supra note 52, at 245 (describing the Massachusetts public debt 
payment plan as "arbitrary" and as "conferring unmerited gains upon individuals"). 
110. See id. 
11 1. See TAYLOR, supra note 4, at 109. 
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many to the brink of insolvency. In response to mass protest, no general 
property taxes were levied in 1785, although the Court levied a special tax 
on court services, which raised the fees of judges, justices of the peace, and 
other officers of the court." 2 In 1786, the General Court responded to 
pressure exerted by unpaid Revolutionary soldiers by imposing a tax of 
?300,000, in part to pay the soldiers' past wages.113 
The impact of the return to the hard-money system, heavy taxes 
beginning in 1779, a federal impost tax first imposed in 1782,14 and the 
stagnation of trade resulting from British and Spanish exclusion, led to an 
overall economic climate of recession and stagnation. McCusker and 
Menard estimate that the performance of the British American economy 
declined 46% in the period 1775 to 1790. The postwar recession, thus, 
rivals the Great Depression, where the per capita gross national product 
declined 48%.115 Shays' Rebellion began in August 1786, propelled by the 
long-run effect of recession and by the harsh responses to the demands for 
legislation that would alleviate the burden of recession on debtors. 
B. Remedial Legislation Preceding Shays' Rebellion 
Heavy taxes and the repeal of the Tender Act in 1780 propelled an 
organized mass protest movement throughout Massachusetts achieving its 
greatest intensity in the famous court closings of 1786 and 1787.16 Debtors 
had become accustomed to an economic climate of easy access to paper 
money." 7 After the repeal of the Tender Act, organizers held conventions 
throughout Massachusetts, particularly in the west where currency was 
most scarce, calling for the issuance of a new government paper money to 
ease credit conditions."18 These efforts were rebuffed entirely. The 
government continued its tax collection activities, refused all demands for a 
paper money and, as mentioned, in 1781, imposed an additional excise tax 
on luxury goods. 
112. See 1784-1785 Mass. Acts 458-62, ch. 18. 
113. See TAYLOR, supra note 4, at 132. 
114. See FERGUSON, supra note 52, at 152. 
115. See MCCUSKER & MENARD, supra note 34, at 373-74 (noting that this estimate may be 
revised with further esearch). 
116. This account relies heavily on Robert J. Taylor's Western Massachusetts in the 
Revolution, which provides the most detailed account of protest activities in years preceding 
Shays' Rebellion. See also NELSON, supra note 21, at 69-72 (discussing the agrarian court reform 
movement of 1780 to 1786). 
117. Of course, depreciating money permitted debtors to repay creditors less in real terms 
than what they had borrowed. Those debtors who wanted to maintain continuing relations with 
creditors may not have taken advantage of the opportunity to pay the nominal, rather than the real, 
value of the debt. See TAYLOR, supra note 4, at 105. Nonetheless, immediate cancellation of 
paper money and reversion to use of gold and silver was likely to make credit more costly and 
incur hardship on both creditors and debtors. 
118. See id. at 107. 
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After the failure of the paper money initiatives, organized protesters 
challenged the costliness and inefficiency of the common pleas courts.119 
Their principal concern was that court fees were unjustly high and 
represented abuse by government officials and lawyers whose income was 
based on fees.'20 The protesters also claimed that officials and lawyers 
routinely over-charged litigants for attendance and transportation.'2' The 
judicial system seemed entirely structured around the interests of those 
profiting from it-judges and lawyers-rather than the creditors who relied 
on the courts for collection or the debtors compelled by process to pay the 
fees. 
In the period preceding Shays' Rebellion, however, the General Court 
rejected these reform demands as well and passed remedial acts of only 
minor import. In 1782 the General Court empowered justices of the peace 
to record debtors' confessions of judgment for a reduced fee (thirty 
pence).'22 This statute marks the first important attempt to use the justices 
of the peace to serve a recording function. These fees were remarkably low 
for the time, representing approximately one day's farm labor in rural 
Massachusetts.'23 Moreover, the statute only required creditors to execute 
on the debtors' goods within three years, which suggests that the purpose of 
the statute was to encourage creditors to record and secure their debts well 
in advance of execution.'24 The impact of the statute was limited, however, 
because it did not expand the jurisdiction of the justices of the peace, then 
limited to cases involving less than ?2.125 
In 1784, in response to the statewide protests against the common pleas 
courts, the General Court enacted a second statute advancing the judicial 
system further towards a recording function by expanding the jurisdiction 
of justices of the peace to matters up to ?4.126 This act was likely to have 
had a substantial impact on debt litigation, because it provided a less 
119. The issue of court fees naturally followed from the rejection of the proposal for the 
issuance of paper money because cheaper money would have remedied the protestors' complaints. 
Inflation lowered the real, as opposed to nominal, value of court fees as well as debts. When the 
value of money was increased substantially (deflation), the costs of litigation were felt more 
severely. As discussed infra Section IV.C, another problem of the time was that under conditions 
of severe recession, high court fees did not deter litigation. Litigation volume grew despite the 
increase in the real value of the fees. 
120. See TAYLOR, supra note 4, at 113. 
121. See id. at 115. 
122. See 1782-1783 Mass. Acts 53-59, ch. 21. 
123. See supra text accompanying note 59. 
124. See 1782-1783 Mass. Acts 55, ch. 21. 
125. A second remedial act in 1782 was the Pine Board Act, which for one year enumerated 
cattle, sheep, swine, flour and other goods as tender for the purpose of private debts. See id. at 31, 
ch. 10. The effect of the Pine Board Act was limited as well, and it may have influenced creditors 
to wait to litigate until 1783, when debts would again have to be paid in specie or its equivalent. 
See TAYLOR, supra note 4, at 117. 
126. See 1782-1783 Mass. Acts 605-09, ch. 42. 
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expensive process for smaller debts. For all cases involving debts greater 
than ?4, however, the court system remained unchanged. 
Thus, before the court closings beginning in 1786, the Massachusetts 
legislature made only token efforts to address the problems at the forefront 
of the protest. Section C examines the basis for the Rebellion more 
carefully by analyzing how recession conditions affected the decision to 
litigate over debt, and by reviewing the actual litigation data from Plymouth 
County before and after the Rebellion. 
C. Changes in Litigation Preceding Shays' Rebellion 
Shays' Rebellion was a reaction to the high costs of credit and court 
fees in an environment of deflation and recession. In conditions of 
deflation, the value of currency appreciates. Obligations increased in value 
in real terms as a result of deflation in Massachusetts between 1780 and 
1786, because both court fees and existing debts were set in nominal 
amounts. As described earlier, in stable economic conditions, high court 
fees would lower total litigation volume. Under conditions of severe 
recession and deflation, however, creditors' incentives often changed. 
During periods of recession, more businesses fail, consumer demand 
drops, and unemployment increases. Each of these economic forces is likely 
to increase litigation over debts. Tight money, or greater demand for 
liquidity, typically a feature of recessions, can in itself have widespread 
implications for litigation rates, especially in contexts of an interwoven 
fabric of credit and debt among merchants, traders, farmers, and others. If 
faced with litigation, a creditor is more likely to begin proceedings against 
her own debtors, to gather assets to ward off foreclosure. These demands, in 
turn, pressure debtors to call in debts from their debtors, who are forced to 
do the same.'27 
Widespread business failure also means that more investments will 
unexpectedly prove unprofitable, requiring litigation in cases in which it 
would otherwise not be necessary. Recessions generate greater uncertainty, 
not only as to which businesses are doing well and which are not, but also 
as to which debtors are the subject of lawsuits that may allow other 
creditors to gain priority.'28 Litigation does not follow necessarily. High 
litigation fees and their depletion of available assets create incentives to 
reach out-of-court settlements. But the existence of competing creditors 
complicates the decision. Each of these factors affected the litigation 
127. See Rosen, supra note 14, at 146. 
128. In the 18th century, there was no system like the current bankruptcy Chapter 11 
regulations to rationalize the process of distribution of the creditor's assets. Thus, creditors had a 
strong incentive to be the first to secure a writ of execution to force an auction of the debtor's 
possessions. 
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environment in Massachusetts preceding Shays' Rebellion.129 Moreover, the 
escalating protest efforts regarding economic hardship may also, ironically, 
have encouraged debt litigation, because creditors sued out of fear that the 
legislature might institute inflationary paper-money policies to bring an end 
to the state's political troubles.130 
Although it is widely known that Shays' Rebellion was precipitated by 
an increase in debt litigation, few works have empirically examined 
litigation trends before Shays' Rebellion to appreciate how serious the crisis 
actually was."3' Figure 1 shows the volume of those note and bond cases 
resulting in default judgments'32 in Plymouth County'33 between 1781 and 
1786, preceding Shays' Rebellion. 
As can be seen in Figure 1, the volume of cases resulting in default 
judgments skyrocketed from 1781 to 1784 in response to the recession, 
multiplying almost three and one-half times. Litigation volume declined, 
however, in 1785, though it increased somewhat in 1786. There are two 
potential reasons for the decline in litigation in 1785. First, as described 
earlier, the General Court in 1784 expanded the jurisdiction of justices of 
the peace from cases on matters involving less than ?2 to cases on matters 
involving less than ?4. This statute was likely to shift litigation to justices 
of the peace, reducing litigation in the common pleas courts. Second, the 
tight money conditions that began in 1781 and continued through 1784 are 
likely to have reduced the volume of available credit and, therefore, of 
129. See Jonathan M. Chu, Debt Litigation and Shays's Rebellion, in IN DEBT TO SHAYS, 
THE BICENTENNIAL OF AN AGRARIAN REVOLUTION 81, 92 (Robert A. Gross ed., 1993) 
(describing how creditors were forced to sue debtors to pay their own debts during Shays' 
Rebellion). 
130. See id. 
131. For other data on the increase in litigation preceding Shays' Rebellion, see, for example, 
SZATMARY, supra note 4, at 29-30. 
132. Figure 1 relies on the same data set used in Table 3. Figure 1 shows the volume of note 
and bonds cases that included a complete date of signing or sealing. The total volume of debt 
cases in each year, of course, was greater. The trends shown here, however, are likely to be 
similar to the trend in total volume of debt cases. 
133. Although Plymouth was not central to Shays' Rebellion, litigation trends there were 
likely to mirror litigation trends in areas that were central to the Rebellion. Shays' Rebellion was a 
reaction to a widespread economic crisis affecting all of New England and, preceding the 
Rebellion, Plymouth's economic problems were similar to those of rural Massachusetts generally. 
See SZATMARY, supra note 4, at 58-59 (describing the geographical scope of Shays' Rebellion); 
Nelson, supra note 16, at 3 (" [T]hroughout the period [1686 to 1859] the county had a pattern of 
economic growth and change that mirrored that of Massachusetts as a whole."). In addition, 
Plymouth's courts were adjourned during the court closings of Shays' Rebellion, so the courts 
may have preempted protest by anticipating the Regulators' demands. The Regulator assaults on 
the courts began after the harvest in August 1786. See SZATMARY, supra note 4, at 58. The 
Plymouth County October 1786 and December 1786 sessions were adjourned to January 8, 1787. 
See 10 PLYMOUTH COURT RECORDS, supra note 16, at 58-65. State militias began suppressing the 
Rebellion in January 1787, the month when the Plymouth Courts reopened. See TAYLOR, supra 
note 4, at 158-59. 
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outstanding debt, reducing the set of obligations potentially subject to 
suit.134 











1781 1782 1783 1784 1785 1786 
Figure 1, thus, shows through litigation statistics the impact of the 
deepening recession on credit after the Revolution. The increased litigation 
between 1781 and 1784 imposed the high costs of colonial courts more 
broadly on the population. Finally, Figure 1 indicates debt litigation rising 
again in 1786, approaching 1783 levels. In 1786, litigation volume was still 
three times greater than in 1781, imposing continuing judicial fee burdens 
on Massachusetts debtors. 
It may be recalled that the principal empirical support for the debt- 
recording interpretation of litigation was a sharp increase in cases resulting 
in default judgments during the first half of the eighteenth century.135 
Colonial legal scholars have interpreted this rise in litigation as evidence of 
134. In addition, litigation volume may have been affected by a combination of other less 
distinctive events. The General Court increased taxes on judicial services in 1785, though not by a 
large amount. See 1784-1785 Mass. Acts 458-62, ch. 18; TAYLOR, supra note 4, at 126. Taylor 
reports that economic conditions somewhat improved in 1785, following unusually good crops in 
1784. See id. at 125. In addition, in response to protests, the General Court suspended taxation in 
1785, though it imposed heavy poll taxes in 1786, perhaps explaining the rise of litigation that 
year. See id. at 126, 129. 
135. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
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commercialization and a prosperous economy. Shays' Rebellion suggests a 
contrasting interpretation of rising default judgments. If defaults are actual 
defaults, and not debt recording, then rising default levels signal widespread 
insolvency and possibly severe recession rather than economic prosperity. 
D. The Adoption of a Debt-Recording System in Response to Shays' 
Rebellion 
The protests immediately preceding Shays' Rebellion began in 1786. In 
response, the General Court swiftly enacted reform legislation. In July 
1786, acknowledging that it was the legislature's duty to provide " speedy" 
decisions "attended with as little expense to the citizens of this 
Commonwealth, as the nature of things will admit," the General Court 
passed legislation establishing procedures for submitting debt cases to 
arbitrators (called referees) for a fee of two shillings. 136 The Shaysites were 
not mollified; court closings began in August 1786. In November, the 
General Court passed the Confession Act,137 effective January 1, 1787, 
requiring that all debt litigation commence before a justice of the peace 
where the debtor was to confess judgment.138 According to the Act, the 
parties were required to record the precise amount of the debt and the exact 
date the debt was due at the hearing.139 Once this process was completed, 
creditors could automatically foreclose on the debtors' possessions fifty 
days after the due date."40 If a debtor did not appear, a default judgment was 
to be entered."'4 
The principal purpose of the Confession Act was to encourage creditors 
to record their debts soon after the time the debt was executed. Thus, the 
Confession Act marks the moment when the Massachusetts courts 
established litigation as a recording device. Of course, the Confession Act 
had further purposes as well. It removed debt litigation from the courts- 
clearly a political response to the years of protest against the court system 
and the violent takeover of the courts in Shays' Rebellion. After the 
Confession Act, dispute over fees and liability were resolved soon after the 
136. See 1786-1787 Mass. Acts 55-57, ch. 21. 
137. 1786-1787 Mass. Acts 105-111, ch. 43. This Act was entitled "An Act for Rendering 
Processes in Law Less Expensive." See id. 
138. See id. at 106-07. Matters involving issues of the title of real estate were excluded from 
the jurisdiction of the justices of the peace. See id. at 106. 
139. For the forms provided by the General Court, see id. at 106-09. 
140. See id. at 108. Another measure to keep litigation out of the courts was to require justices of the peace to encourage debtors who disputed the case to use arbitrators rather than to 
appeal the case to the common pleas court. See id. at 109. The Confession Act did not revise the 
fee schedule, so presumably fees remained at 30 pence. In February 1787, however, the General 
Court issued a new fee schedule that raised the fees of the justices of the peace. See 1786-1787 
Mass. Acts 226-38, ch. 73. 
141. See 1786-1787 Mass. Acts 108, ch. 43. 
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time debts were executed: The courts no longer served as the institution for 
processing debt disputes; thus, the courts could no longer be the focal point 
of resentment. 
The text of the Confession Act reveals that it was perceived by those 
who drafted it to serve as only a temporary resolution to the concerns raised 
by Shays' Rebellion. It was enacted for a limited term-" two Years, and no 
longer" -requiring explicit renewal in 1788.142 The General Court renewed 
the Act in 1788, but only for a four-year period.'43 By June 1, 1792, 
however, the country was long out of the former recession,'" allowing 
litigation conditions to normalize. The General Court allowed the 
Confession Act to expire, permitting a reversion back to the 1784 law 
providing justices of the peace jurisdiction over cases concerning ?4 or 
less.145 The Plymouth County records show that in the period 1792 to 1795 
conditions were similar to those preceding the Rebellion: Cases originated 
in the common pleas, and median litigation timing was nearly identical to 
that before Shays' Rebellion.146 
When did courts assume a debt-recording function? William Nelson 
shows that court fees were radically reduced by the dismantling of the 
British writ and fee system, a doctrinal development occurring gradually 
between 1790 and 1840.147 The law permitting creditors to obtain explicit 
security interests in the personal property of their debtors emerged in the 
period 1820 to 1830.148 Massachusetts enacted its first bankruptcy statute in 
1800, which, although in effect for only two years, was permanently 
reenacted in 1838.149 
V. CONCLUSION: REINTERPRETING THE ROLE OF COLONIAL COURTS IN 
COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS 
The empirical findings presented suggest a new interpretation of the 
colonial court system's role in creating conditions for economic advance. 
This Note analyzes three reasons why the interpretation of default 
142. See id. at 111. 
143. See 1788-1789 Mass. Acts 131, ch. 67. 
144. See MCCUSKER & MENARD, supra note 34, at 63 tbl.3.4 (showing economic growth 
throughout the period 1789 to 1796). 
145. In 1797, upon general conversion from pounds to dollars, an Act passed that explained 
that ?4 was equivalent to $13.33. See 1796-1797 Mass. Acts 373, ch. 21. 
146. In 1795, the median interval between execution and suit was 443 days, almost equal to 
the median during the period 1781 to 1786 (427 days). 
147. See NELSON, supra note 21, at 72-88. 
148. See id. at 253 n.100. For a comprehensive discussion of the legal history of secured 
transactions, see 1 GRANT GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 24-25 
(1965). 
149. See PETER J. COLEMAN, DEBTORS AND CREDITORS IN AMERICA: INSOLVENCY, 
IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT, AND BANKRUPTCY, 1607-1900, at 50-51 (1974). 
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judgments as evidence of the institutionalization of a debt-recording system 
is inadequate. First, examining court fees in relation to debt levels reveals 
that litigation was extremely costly and, in most cases, litigation purely to 
record debts was an undesirable strategy. Indeed, burdening debtors with 
court fees may have decreased creditors' chances of repayment. Second, 
evidence of actual litigation timing shows that creditors did not typically 
file suit immediately, as would be expected if creditors litigated for 
recording purposes. Third, the Regulators' proposals to institutionalize debt 
recording preceding Shays' Rebellion and the General Court's legal 
responses to those proposals are further evidence that such a system did not 
exist during the colonial period. 
Thus, during the colonial period, Massachusetts courts did not provide 
the economic benefits that a debt-recording system, such as the modem 
UCC, achieves by reducing or eliminating uncertainty over collection. In 
the colonial period, creditors and debtors, as a general matter, incurred the 
costs of creditors' uncertainty about their priority with respect to other 
creditors, creditors' uncertainty about the nature of debtors' other debts, and 
the costs of litigating in an expensive system when creditors feared that 
they would not otherwise be repaid. Anecdotal evidence in historians' 
accounts suggests, indeed, that colonial creditors incurred great costs to 
obtain information about debtors' financial status and to keep any negative 
information secret from other creditors. As described by A.G. Roeber, court 
sessions were widely attended and, indeed, "Court days" were regional, 
popular events, in part, because they were the best time for creditors to see 
" who was recovering against whom and what their own roles might be at 
any given moment."150 Outside of court days, creditors worked to keep 
negative information about debtors' financial status secret, according to 
Harrington, because "every creditor hoped to be able to collect his debts 
before the insolvency of the debtor became generally known." 151 Greater 
uncertainty reduces the supply of credit and increases its price. Thus, the 
absence of a debt-recording system in the colonial period reduced the 
supply of credit and increased interest rates, leading to lower levels of 
investment than would otherwise have been possible. 
During times of recession, such as during Shays' Rebellion, however, 
the absence of a debt-recording and -securing system led to a climate of 
extreme uncertainty among creditors. The immediate effect of the absence 
of priority rules during the postwar recession was a race to the courts to 
claim any available assets.152 Skyrocketing litigation meant skyrocketing 
150. See ROEBER, supra note 14, at 85. For a description of "Court day" in Virginia, see id. 
at 73-95. 
151. See HARRINGTON, supra note 66, at 1 19. 
152. These are the conditions bankruptcy statutes of the 19th century were enacted to remedy. 
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fees imposed on debtors. In essence, colonial court fees functioned as an 
insolvency tax. By means of this "tax," the colonial courts dealt debtors a 
severe blow at the worst possible time. The lack of a recording system 
reduced the supply of credit and increased interest rates universally, and 
equally important, worsened economic conditions during recessions. These 
problems characterized the many recessions faced before the Revolution as 
well as Shays' Rebellion. 
How much did colonial courts affect economic conditions? It is 
impossible to quantify the costs of not having a debt-recording and 
-securing system during the colonial period. It may be recalled, however, 
that approximately three-fourths of noncriminal cases in the colonial period 
were debt-collection matters, so that, in terms of courts' function in the 
economy, the lack of a debt-recording system was highly important."53 This 
Note concludes, however, that the debt-recording interpretation of colonial 
law and its implications for the role of the courts in enhancing economic 
growth must be substantially qualified or rejected. 
153. See supra note 13. 
